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COMMENT
ALL'S FAIR IN LOVE AND PRIVATE VIDEO
RECORDING-THE COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ISSUES IN THE
SONY CASE
The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power to
enact laws "To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors. . . the exclusive Right to Their. . . writings"' In
the exercise of this power, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976
(Act).2 The Act grants certain exclusive rights to copyright owners in their
copyrighted works3 for limited times,' including the exclusive right to
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1976)).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). This section provides:
[T]he owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work ... ; (4) ... to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and (5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1976). The Act provides that an author has exclusive rights
in his work for the following lengths of time: (I) for works created on or after January 1,
1978, or created before January 1, 1978 but not published or copyrighted by that date, copy-
right protection for individual authors generally lasts from the time of the work's creation
through the life of the author plus 50 years after his death, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 303 (1976);
(2) for works with an existing first term copyright on January 1, 1978, copyright protection
lasts for 28 years from the date the copyright was originally secured, and the proprietor of
the copyright may renew the copyright for one additional term of 47 years, 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(a) (1976); (3) for works with an existing copyright already in its renewal term on Janu-
ary 1, 1978, copyright protection lasts so that the total period of copyright protection (origi-
nal and renewal term) will total seventy-five years from the date that the copyright was
originally secured, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976). 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9.01 (1980).
The copyright law assumes that the public receives a benefit by granting authors certain
exclusive rights to their creative works. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text infra. Monop-
oly, however, is anathema to the fundamental national policy, represented in the antitrust
laws, of fostering free competition and preventing restraints on trade. See United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Con-
ference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966). See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075
(9th Cir. 1970); California v. FPC, 296 F.2d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The time limitations
serve as a resolution of this apparent conflict. The law assumes that the limitation is suffi-
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make copies of the copyrighted work.'
Implicit in both the Constitution and the Act is the idea that authors
should be encouraged to create and disseminate their creative works
through the promise of economic reward. 6 The purpose of the Act, imple-
menting the constitutional directive "to promote the Progress of Science,"
is to bestow the benefit of the continual creation of artistic works upon the
public.7 The limited grant of exclusivity, by securing economic reward to
authors, is merely the vehicle by which Congress has attempted to secure
for the public the benefit of artistic creation. 8
Despite the broad public benefits intended by the Constitution and the
Act, the copyright scheme's restrictions on access to copyrighted works cre-
ates a tension with the public's interest in the freest possible access to infor-
mation.9 As the principal method of balancing the interest in exclusivity
of the copyright owner against the public interest in unrestricted access,
courts developed the "fair use" doctrine.'° In applying a fair use analysis,
courts examine four factors: 1 (1) the nature of the copyrighted work;' 2 (2)
cient to avoid imposing the excessive costs of monopoly upon the public. See Seltzer, Ex-
emptions and Fair Use in Copyright.- The "Exclusive Rights" Tension in the New Copyright
Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 215, 221 (1977).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (1976).
6. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 447 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20
WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 90 (1978).
7. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Seltzer, supra note 4, at 221.
8. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Seltzer, supra note 4, at 221.
9. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 216. See Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public
Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN L. REV. 243, 244 (1978). As to the
possible copyright infringement of audiovisual works, the court, in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, stated: "Protection of the public interest requires balancing
the need for wide availability of audiovisual works against the need for monetary reward to
authors to assure production of these works." 480 F. Supp. at 432.
10. See Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). Section 107 was intended by Congress merely to restate the
existing fair use doctrine as it was judicially developed under the Copyright Act of 1909, and
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d at 1068. Further, Con-
gress does not consider the four statutory factors to be determinative. Rather, they are
merely used by way of example. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05. Courts have also
considered factors other than the traditional four to be relevant in a fair use analysis. For
instance, one court stated:
[Alt least four tests are appropriate to determine whether the doctrine applies: (I)
Was there a substantial taking, qualitatively or quantitatively? (2) If there was
such a taking, did the taking materially reduce the demand for the original copy-
righted property? (3) ...does the distribution of the material serve the public
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the purpose and character of the use; 3 (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;' 4 and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work (the harm factor).' 5 If a court finds that an unauthorized use
of a copyrighted work is a fair use, then there has been no infringement of
the copyright.' 6
The growing use of home videotape recorders (VTRs) by private indi-
viduals to record copyrighted programs broadcast on television raises the
question of whether such recording infringes the copyright owners' exclu-
sive right to make copies of the televised material. In Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,'7 the United States District Court for
the Central District of California in applying the four factors of the fair
use doctrine and considering the legislative history of the Act, concluded
that the videotape recording of copyrighted televised programs by private
individuals for their own private home viewing constituted a fair use of the
copyrighted material and thus was a noninfringing use. 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with the Sony case presently
before it on appeal,' 9 has now undertaken the burden of wrestling with the
home videotape recording controversy.
This comment will explore the issues confronted by the Sony court in its
infringement analysis of home-use video recording of copyrighted broad-
casts, first by using the four factors of the fair use doctrine as generally
applied and then by applying the factors to problems peculiar to home
VTR use. Finally, the article will balance the factors to reach a conclusion
interest in the free dissemination of information: ... (4) does the preparation of
the material require the use of prior materials dealing with the same subject mat-
ter?
Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior Film Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Ac-
cording to another court, the weight of authority indicates that "to constitute 'fair use' the
permitted use must be for some legitimate, fair and reasonable purpose." Tennessee
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1970).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1976). Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a]f'dmem., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
13. 17 U.S.C § 107(1) (1976). Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at
1352.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976). Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at
1352.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976). Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at
1352.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
17. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
18. Id. at 442, 443-47, 450-56.
19. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of American, No. 79-3683 (9th Cir., filed
Nov. 1, 1979).
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on the issue of whether private individuals engage in a noninfringing fair
use when they tape copyrighted programs for their own private viewing.
I. PRIVATE VIDEO RECORDING-THE Sony ANALYSIS
William Griffiths, a citizen of California, owned a Betamax video tape
recorder. 2° The Betamax VTR, manufactured by the Sony Corporation
(Sony) and distributed in the United States by the Sony Corporation of
America (Sonam), can record telecasts as they are broadcast and make
copies of the broadcast material for later viewing. 2' William Griffiths re-
corded for his own home viewing portions of various programs broadcast
over commercial public airwaves, including twenty minutes of a motion
picture called "Never Give An Inch" and two episodes from the television
series "Baa Baa Black Sheep" and "Holmes and Yo-Yo." All of these
programs were produced by Universal City Studios, Inc. (Universal).22
Universal and Walt Disney Productions, Inc. (Disney)23 filed suit
against Sony, Sonam, several retail stores selling the Betamax, an agency
retained by Sony to advertise the Betamax, and William Griffiths. Univer-
sal and Disney contended that manufacturing, distributing, advertising,
and selling the Betamax caused, induced, or at the very least, encouraged
Griffiths and others to make unauthorized recordings of copyrighted mo-
tion pictures, and thus made Sony, Sonam, the advertiser, and the various
retailers liable for contributory infringement.24 The plaintiffs requested an
injunction restraining further manufacturing, distributing, selling, and ad-
20. 480 F. Supp. at 433.
21. Id at 432.
22. Id. at 436.
23. Disney demonstrated that copies of its programs, "The New Mickey Mouse Club"
and "The Wonderful World of Disney," had been made by persons other than Griffiths.
24. 480 F. Supp. at 441-52, 459. Plaintiffs also brought suit under various other theo-
ries. Sony and Sonam, it argued, should be liable as direct infringers because they furnished
the instrumentality for the alleged infringing activity and because they knew and expected
that the major use of Betamax would be to record copyrighted material off-the-air. Id at
457. The district court found that, because the defendants did not provide the copyrighted
work themselves or manage stores in which the actual copying occurred, their involvement
in the infringing activity was neither substantial nor direct and therefore they could not be
held liable. Id at 458. Plaintiffs also argued that the defendants were vicariously liable
because they had both a right and an ability to supervise the infringing activity and a direct
financial interest in the activity. Id at 461. The court rejected this argument because the
defendants could not control the purchasers' uses of the machines once they were bought,
and because the defendants did not depend on an infringing use to derive financial benefit.
Id. Finally, the retail sellers were also sued for direct infringement, as they had made copies
of plaintiffs' programs for the purpose of demonstrating the Betamax to customers. Because
such recording did not harm the plaintiffs, the court found it to be a noninfringing fair use.
Id at 456-57.
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vertising of Betamax VTRs and tapes.25
Before a defendant can be found liable for contributory infringement, it
must be demonstrated that a direct infringement has occurred.26 Thus, the
Sony court was faced with determining whether the off-the-air recording
of telecast copyrighted programs by Griffiths for private home viewing
constituted a direct infringement of the copyright in the films." The court
based its analysis of the home-use issue on the four fair use factors: harm,
substantiality of the use, purpose of the use, and the nature of the copy-
righted work.28
The district court first considered whether home recording caused harm
to the television market for the copyrighted films.2 9 Noting that the test
requires an examination of the probable detrimental effect of the use on
the potential market for a copyrighted work, rather than an assessment of
the actual economic detriment experienced by the copyright owner, the
court declared that it was hesitant to identify the probable harmful effects
of home-use copying.30 The court gave two reasons for this hesitancy: the
number of doubtful assumptions upon which a finding of harm must be
based31 and the rapidly changing marketing system upon which a predic-
tion of harm would have been based.32
25. Id at 463.
26. Id at 459 (discussing Gershwin Publishing Corp., v. Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
27. 480 F. Supp. at 441. It appeared that the suit against Griffiths was brought merely
to ease the problems of demonstrating direct infringement. Griffiths, a client of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys, consented to be sued, and had claims for damages or costs against him
waived. Id at 437.
28. Id at 450-56. For a discussion of these four fair use factors, see notes 10-15 and
accompanying text supra.
29. 480 F. Supp. at 451-52, 466. Home-recording of televised programs could affect
other markets, such as the market for prerecorded video cassettes. See Note, Home Video
Recording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 616-17 (1979).
30. 480 F. Supp. at 452. For a discussion of the "potential market diminishment" test as
the proper test for assessing harm, see id at 451; Comment, Copyright Implications Attendant
Upon the Use ofHome Video Tape Recorders, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 279, 286 (1979); Meero-
pol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States suggested that the harm which must be proven is
actual economic detriment, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afrd mem., 420 U.S. 376
(1975). This approach, however, has not been widely followed; see Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 450-51. Another test for harm which is
similar to the "potential market diminishment" test is whether the copying tends materially
to reduce demand for the original work. See Note, supra note 29, at 612.
31. 480 F. Supp. at 452. These assumptions are discussed in detail in the harm factor
analysis. See notes 52-71 and accompanying text infra.
32. 480 F. Supp. at 452. For a discussion of the change in the marketing system, see
notes 61-66 and accompanying text infra.
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In addressing the substantiality factor of the fair use doctrine, the court
acknowledged that "[hjome use recording off-the-air usually involves
copying the entire work" and that, "in the normal case of copying, the
effect that the infringing copy has on the market for the original will de-
pend to a large extent on whether the copy can substitute for the origi-
nal."3 3  The court, however, attempted to discount the apparent
substantiality of the taping by noting that "[1]ike other variables in the fair
use analysis, the substantiality factor is inextricably bound with the issue
of harm."34 Because no harm accompanied the substantial use, the taping
of the whole was still considered a fair use.35
The Sony court also found that the nature of the copyrighted material
indicated fair use. The court found that the salient feature of the copied
films was that they were "voluntarily . . . telecast over public airwaves to
individual homes free of charge."36 The court emphasized that the oppor-
tunity to use public airwaves allows copyright owners to disseminate their
works more widely than would be possible through their own efforts. 3 7
The court found that the final fair use factor, the purpose of the copying,
also indicated a fair use. Characterizing the copying of the films as "non-
commercial" and noting that the copying increased "access to the materi-
als plaintiffs choose to broadcast, ' '31 the court indicated that, because the
use occurs within private homes, enforcement of a prohibition would be
highly intrusive and practically impossible.39 The court deemed the in-
crease of access purpose of home-use video taping to be "consistent with
the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to in-
formation through the public airwaves."4
Thus, the district court found that the home-use copying of copyrighted
33. 480 F. Supp. at 454.
34. Id.
35. Id For a discussion of the substantiality analysis as applied to home VTR use, see
notes 72-82 and accompanying text infra.
36. 480 F. Supp. at 453. For a discussion of the effect of the voluntary nature of broad-
cast films on the fair use analysis, see notes 115-26 and accompanying text infra.
37. 480 F. Supp. at 453. The court declined to base its analysis on the more traditional
fair use characterization of the nature of the work, e.g., scientific or educational. Id at 452.
For a discussion of a traditional fair use analysis of the nature of broadcast films which are
copied on VTRs, see notes 83-93 and accompanying text infra.
38. 480 F. Supp. at 453-54.
39. Id at 454.
40. Id Aside from its noncommercial argument, the bulk of the court's reasoning is
based on first amendment grounds rather than a more traditional analysis. Id For a discus-
sion of a traditional fair use analysis of the private, noncommercial character of the copying
of broadcast films, see notes 94-107 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the
first amendment arguments, see notes 127-54 and accompanying text infra.
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films constituted a fair use.4' To buttress its conclusion, the court argued
that the legislative history pertaining to a 1971 amendment to the Copy-
right Act of 1909 indicated a congressional intent to permit recording of
televised programs for the limited purpose of private viewing.4 2
II. FAIR USE AND PRIVATE VIDEO RECORDING--A GENERAL
APPROACH
The Sony court, as most courts do when applying the fair use doctrine,
applied the four traditional fair use factors in an ad hoc fashion, with little
suggestion of a principled basis founded in the Constitution from which
the copyright scheme arises.43 A principled, constitutional basis for deci-
sionmaking is present nonetheless whenever the following two circum-
stances exist: (1) a "greater public interest"' in allowing the specific use
outweighs the general public benefits derived from restricted access;4 5 and
41. 480 F. Supp. at 456.
42. Id. at 443-47. For a discussion of congressional intent regarding an exemption for
VTR recording for private purposes, see notes 164-81 and accompanying text infra.
With the court's finding of no direct infringement by Griffiths, the plaintiffs' arguments
against the business defendants for contributory infringement became untenable. See note
26 and accompanying text supra. The district court stated that, even if it held that VTR
recording for private use was a direct infringement, the suit for contributory infringement
would still fail because the business defendants lacked the requisite knowledge of the in-
fringing activity. 480 F. Supp. at 459. Finally, the court noted that, even if the business
defendants were liable for contributory infringement, the drastic injunctive relief sought
would not be granted due to an insufficient showing of the requisite harm. Id at 468-69.
43. The process of applying the fair use doctrine has been characterized as the most
troublesome process in all of copyright law. Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)). Neither the courts nor the statute have provided clear
guidance as to the relative weight to be accorded the four factors. See Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 448. The doctrine's boundaries are
exceptionally elusive. Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp.
1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Its application "belong[s] to ... the metaphysics of the law,
where the distinctions are . . . very subtle and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent."
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)
(quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)). Thus, analy-
sis under the fair use doctrine consists essentially of an ad hoc application of the four broad
fair use factors to the facts of the individual case. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'dmem., 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
44. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), arf'd
mem., 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
45. See Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 790, 800-01 (1975).
The raison d'etre for copyright protection is to benefit the public. Insofar as the public
interest is best served in a particular case by allowing the use of the copyrighted work, the
raison d'etre for the protection vanishes. See Note, supra note 6, at 95, n.60-61.
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(2) the use does not lead to a reduction in the incentive to create and dis-
close the creations.46 Application of the fair use doctrine reaches this con-
stitutionally sound result because the four factor test neatly subsumes these
two circumstances. The exploration of the "nature" and "purpose" factors
in the fair use analysis promotes an inquiry into the existence of some
"greater public interest; '47 courts use the "substantiality" and "harm" fac-
tors to facilitate an understanding of possible reductions in incentive to
create.48
A. No Harm, No Foul-The Reduction In Incentive Prong
1. The Harm Factor
In determining the possible harm to the television market resulting from
the home-use recording of televised programs, an understanding of the ec-
onomics of television is essential.49 The owners of copyrights in broadcast
films derive their revenue not directly from payments by the viewer, but
rather from royalties paid by the broadcasters to the owners for the right to
show the copyrighted films on television. Broadcasters, in turn, are com-
pensated by advertisers who use the televised works as a vehicle to reach
potential consumers of their products. Thus, the royalties negotiated be-
tween the copyright owner and the broadcasters depend to a great extent
on the amount advertisers are willing to pay broadcasters.
Advertisers' decisions as to the times and prices of advertisements are
based on the size and demographics of the audiences for broadcast shows.
The size and demographics of audiences for various programs are mea-
sured by rating services, such as the A. C. Nielsen Company and Arbitron.
Two methods are commonly used by the rating services to measure audi-
ences: (1) rating meters which measure only the size of audiences by re-
cording when a set is turned on and to what channel it is tuned; and (2)
46. Since the very purpose for granting exclusive rights to copyright owners is to pro-
vide the economic reward that will act as an incentive for the creative process, a use which
reduces the reward and thus the incentive to create is anathema to the copyright scheme.
See Note, supra note 6, at 120. To the contrary, a use which does not affect the market for
the work and the consequent monetary reward will not affect the incentive to create; copy-
right owners will be indifferent to such a use. Thus, allowing such use serves both interests
of the copyright scheme by granting the public access to creative works without lessening the
economic incentives to the creators of the work.
47. For discussion of the "greater public interest" prong as it relates to the VTR home
use issue, see notes 83-154 and accompanying text infra.
48. For a discussion of the reduction in incentive prong regarding home use of VTRs,
see notes 49-82 and accompanying text infra.
49. For a discussion of the rudiments of television economics, see Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 440; Note, supra note 29, at 578-83.
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diaries in which both the program being viewed and extensive demo-
graphic information are recorded." The rating services traditionally de-
liver to advertisers the size and demographic information derived from
these two methods correlated to the time at which a particular program
was broadcast.5
The plaintiffs in Sony argued that the video recording of televised films
would harm the owners of the films' copyrights by reducing the audiences
for original broadcasts and increasing the number of persons watching
videotape playbacks as an alternative.5 One assumption inherent in this
argument is that large numbers of households will own VTRs in the near
future.5 ' This assumption is supported by recent data showing increasing
sales of VTRs. 4 Another underlying assumption is that a large number of
these VTR owners will buy blank tapes for taping off-the-air. It appears
that this assumption also appears to be valid.56 A third inherent assump-
tion is that people view tapes only when they would otherwise be watching
50. For a general discussion of audience profiles and ratings methods, see Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 440-41; Note, supra note 29, at
578-83. Demographics are a statistical profile of group characteristics including such impor-
tant variables as age, sex, and income bracket. 480 F. Supp. at 441.
51. Demographic information correlated to the time of audience viewing is known as
"daypart demographics." See generally Marich, Advertiser-created programs coming into
play, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 68; New media mean new ad strategies, BROAD-
CASTING, Oct. 6, 1980, at 28.
52. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 466. A
reduction in audience size will cause broadcasters to receive lower fees from advertisers.
This decrease in advertising revenue, in turn, will lower royalties to copyright owners.
In finding that the nature of broadcast films was indicative of fair use, the Sony court
stated that "[blecause [owners of copyrights in broadcast films] derive their revenues only
indirectly from the alleged infringer of their work, the harm resulting from the infringement
is more speculative." Id. at 453. The complexity of television economics, however, would
not make the harm any less real if television audiences were actually reduced.
53. Id at 451.
54. See Forkan, Movie makers may add rental to tape sales, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 3,
1980, at 75. ("Many industry experts ... seemed to think that [VTR] homes could pass the
2,000,000 plateau by year end, given 800,000 or so units sold during 1980. Sales through
October 3 [1980] were just over 507,500 units, . . . up 65%").
55. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 451.
56. See Mayer, Home Video Fever. High Tech in the Living Room, HIGH FIDELITY &
MUSICAL AMERICA, June, 1980, at 103 ("blank videotapes typically outsell prerecorded ones
20 to 1 . . ., that's a fairly clear indication that most [VTRs] are used for taping off-the-air");
Cavanicus, The Video Imperative, SATURDAY REVIEW, Sept., 1980, at 95 ("most [VTRs] are
used simply to record off-the-air TV programs"). However, the growing interest and sales of
video cassettes with films prerecorded on them, see Note, supra note 29, at 616-17, may
indicate a trend away from the VTR use of VTRs for off-the-air taping toward their use to
play prepackaged cassettes. See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 480 F. Supp. at 467-68.
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a live broadcast.57 This assumption is unjustified. Tape watching is proba-
bly part of a wider "entertainment" market which involves consumers who
wish to be entertained and not just to "watch T.V." '58
Even if tape watching diminishes the size of live television audiences,
the conclusion that harm results rests on the dubious premise that the
amounts advertisers will pay to broadcasters depend solely upon the size of
audiences for live television broadcasts.59 If ratings are able to reflect
VTR playback viewing as well as live television viewing, the audiences for
these playbacks will be reflected in the ratings for the original broadcast
and will constitute an additional factor to determine advertising revenues
for a particular broadcast.60 Rating methods are rapidly changing to re-
flect the new playback audience of previously recorded programs. 61 Al-
though rating meters are unable to record playbacks of prerecorded tapes
on VTRs, diaries are capable of recording these playbacks as well as
57. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 451.
58. See id at 466. Recent indications are that in reality there exists little threat to televi-
sion audiences from VTR use, supporting the view that VTR viewing is not harmful to live
audience ratings. See Public TVstudy says VCR's don't detract from viewing levels, BROAD-
CASTING, July 21, 1980, at 46 ("[a] new study of video cassette recorders concludes there is
little danger that the use of VCR tapes could have a negative effect on broadcast audience
sizes"); Forkan, supra note 55 (quoting Herb Granath, vice-president in charge of ABC
Video Enterprises as saying that one of the early findings from their ongoing study indicated
that "video will not substantially affect [television] audiences for the foreseeable future");
New media mean new ad strategies, supra note 51, at 28-29. Cf. Not to worry, BROADCAST-
ING, May 12, 1980, at 48 ("in the eighties, . . . 'all the new technologies combined will
probably reduce our audience only by about 10%." That decline in audience share, how-
ever, will be offset by at least a 10% increase in total television homes.").
59. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 466.
60. See Ratings expert sees home VTR reshaping US. television, BROADCASTING, Nov.
14, 1977, at 22. ("Home video tape recording holds the promise of significantly increasing
commercial television's audience ...and requiring changes in T.V. audience measure-
ment.").
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of/America, plaintiff copyright owners argued
that the ability of many VTRs to automatically "turn on" to record programs at preselected
time periods on preselected stations, enabling viewers to tape shows which they are not
watching in person, see Marich, supra note 52, at 68, would lead to a decrease in ratings and
thus revenue. 480 F. Supp. 429, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The assumption is that rating services
are incapable of measuring this recording by an "absent" viewer and consequently that the
viewing of advertising will not be measured. Id If playbacks are part of the overall audi-
ence for a television program, however, the fact that this videotape recording of the live
program may not be recorded by the meter rating services is irrelevant, since the subsequent
viewing of the advertising during playback will be recorded by the diary method. Even if
the recording by an absent viewer were relevant, the argument fails because Nielsen rating
meters already credit videotape recording. Id; Note, supra note 29, at 614; Ratings expert
sees home VTR reshaping U.S. television, at 22.
61. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 466.
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demographics and the actual program being viewed.6 2 Nonetheless, ad-
vertisers may balk at paying for the new market of playback viewers be-
cause ratings traditionally are reported as a function of the time of
broadcast.63 Since playbacks may be made at any time, ' the disruption of
traditional audience measurement techniques could render ratings for
playback audiences meaningless. This potential problem, essentially one
of accurately determining the demographics of a particular program's au-
dience, can be solved, however, through more extensive use of diary serv-
ices and development of more sophisticated techniques, enabling the
rating services to devise demographics based on program content rather
than only on "time-slot."65 Indeed, both Nielsen and Arbitron are in the
process of developing frameworks for additional survey work to lead ulti-
mately to the measurement of videotape recorder usage.66 Thus, advertis-
ing revenues need not depend only upon viewers of original broadcasts;
new rating techniques will allow advertisers to take into account the play-
back of videotape recordings in computing their fees.67
Another assumption essential to the argument that VTR use will cause
harm is that those who record and view tapes never view the commer-
62. Note, supra note 29, at 614. Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 480 F. Supp. at 441 ("At the time of trial, the Nielsen diary surveys made no
specific reference to videotape recorder usage, and the only playback information obtained
was what people volunteered in the diary.").
63. See generally note 51 and accompanying text supra.
64. The "time shift" capability of VTRs, see note 60 supra, enables a VTR owner to
watch a recorded program at a different time than the program's network "time-slot," see
Marich, supra note 51, at 68; Chew, Innovations in video-nightmarefor networks?, ADVER-
TISING AGE, May 30, 1977, at 70.
65. Note, supra note 29, at 616 (discussing VTR's Breaking and Entering the Home Mar-
ket, BROADCASTING, Oct. 24, 1977, at 34).
66. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 441.
67. Id at 466. Another of the assumptions inherent in the argument that tape viewing
will cut into the audience for original television broadcasts is that those who taped programs
would keep tapes for repeat viewing over a long period of time. Id at 451. Since playback
audiences are an additive component to television ratings, the building of tape libraries and
repeat viewing would tend to increase revenues rather than lead to their reduction. Even if
the assumption were valid, the most recent indications are that VTR users are in fact not
recording television programs with a view toward creating libraries for long term viewing.
See Mayer, supra note 56, at 103 ("A recent Gallup poll tells us that, with the exception of
teenagers, most people watch the program they record only once."); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 438 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (discussing surveys
showing 70.4% of programs viewed by tape playback were viewed only once; 57.9% of view-
ers had no further plans for viewing; and 55.8% of VTR owners had 10 or fewer tapes in
their library). Certainly the type of program taped by Griffiths, e.g., Baa-Baa Black Sheep
and Holmes and Yo- Yo, indicated VTR use for mere "time shift" purposes, i.e., to watch a
program the owner would otherwise have missed. They were not of the "classic" variety
which one might expect would be saved for repeat viewing.
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cials. 61 Commercial avoidance may be accomplished in two ways: fast-
forwarding through commercials as the playback is viewed, or deleting
them at the recording stage by depressing the pause button to halt the re-
cording temporarily. 69 A tape viewer using the fast-forwarding technique
will still be effectively exposed to the advertising message, albeit at a
quickened pace.7° Deletion of commercials during recording similarly
poses little threat to advertisers; few viewers presently delete commercials
while taping original broadcasts. 7 '
68. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 451. The
argument that playbacks will increase the potential audience and thus increase the potential
value of the films, see note 67 and accompanying text supra, in turn assumes that commer-
cials are viewed by playback audiences. See Note, supra note 9, at 245.
69. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 435-36.
70. Since the great majority of products sold are indistinguishable from their competing
brands, advertising which merely informs consumers is not likely to motivate a consumer to
buy the advertised product. Reed, The Psychological Impact of TVAdvertising and the Need
For FTC Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171, 173-74 (1975). Rather, the vast majority of ad-
vertising is designed to influence the consumer to buy the product by creating an uncon-
scious association between the advertised product and fulfillment of some basic human need
or desire, such as love, sex, and approval. Id at 173-78. The effectiveness of this uncon-
scious message of advertising in influencing consumer behavior increases as the critical at-
tention the viewer pays to the advertisement, the conscious involvement he has with the
commercial, decreases. Id at 178-80. It is the passivity with which television audiences
approach television commercials which makes television such an effective advertising me-
dium. Id See also Reed and Coalson, Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrines Meets Twentieth
Century Marketing Techniques.- FTC Regulation of Emotionally Conditioning Advertising,
11 GA. L. REV. 733, 748-51 (1977); W. KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION 158 (1973). The pas-
sivity with which a viewer would regard a fast-forwarded commercial suggests that his sus-
ceptibility to the subliminal message would be increased.
The above argument assumes that fast-forwarding will not destroy the ability of the
viewer to perceive the advertising message. While the speed of the forwarding may destroy
the conscious perception of the commercial, the subconscious, which the advertising is
designed to reach, instantly perceives and records all meaning. See W. KEY, at 53, 163
(information flashed at 1/3000 of a second has been experimentally shown to be implanted
in subconscious). The symbols and words which advertisers specifically place in commer-
cials are intended to be subliminally perceived even at normal speeds and will still reach the
viewer's unconscious at fast-forward speeds. Reed and Coalson, at 740; W. KEY, at 156-70;
see also Concerning the Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception" Tech-
niques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016 (1974).
The fear of fast-forwarding in any case appears to be of little importance in actuality. A
survey by defendants in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica showed that
only 25% of playback viewers were fast-forwarding through the commercials. 480 F. Supp.
at 439, 468.
71. A survey by the manufacturers of Sony's Betamax VTR showed that 92% of pro-
grams were recorded with commercials. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 480 F. Supp. at 468. One reason that viewers do not delete commercials is that the
practice may be too tedious. Id Thus, a real concern for advertisers might occur if future
VTRs came equipped with "automatically controlled... in-home microcomputers that are
'assigned the task of editing out T.V. commercials,"' in that a VTR so equipped could edit
out commercials without the presence of the owner. Chew, supra note 64, at 70. The as-
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2 The Substantiality Factor
In addition to the harm factor, it is also necessary to consider whether
the use in question consists of a substantial portion of a copyrighted work,
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, in order to determine
whether the use will lead to a reduction in incentive to create.72 The tradi-
tional approach is to examine the significance of the copying" both in
qualitative and quantitative terms.74 One must consider not only the sheer
amount of the work appropriated, but also whether the portion copied
contains the essence, central premise, or main idea of the copyrighted
work;7" whether there is similarity in style or form of expression between
the original and the copied material;76 and whether the copier needs to use
the appropriated material in the production of the new work.77 Nonethe-
sumption that VTR users never view the commercials of a broadcast might come true in
such a case. Still, the present state of the art has no such feature, see Popular Electronics,
June, 1980, and in any case advertisers could possibly avoid the automatic deleter as pres-
ently envisioned. Chew, supra note 64, at70.
72. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454 ("in
the normal case of copying, the effect that the infringing copy has on the market for the
original will depend to a large extent on whether the copy can substitute for the original");
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), quoted in Seltzer, supra note 4,
at 245. See also Note, supra note 29, at 607.
73. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689
(S.D.N.Y.), afdper curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
74. Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
217, 222 (D.N.J. 1977) (a "bald quantitative approach is not determinative" of whether the
substantiality factor indicates fair use).
75. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 n.12
(S.D.N.Y.), a fdper curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering the importance of the
portion taken in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole).
76. A verbatim copying or very close paraphrase suggests substantiality, id at 690;
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); whereas little or no similarity indicates no substantial copying,
see Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
77. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D.N.J.
1977). The "need" qualitative factor is a qualification of the statement of many courts that
one is not entitled to utilize the fruits of another's labor in lieu of his own independent
research. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Orgel v.
Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962). Courts have modified the sweeping gen-
erality of this reasoning by allowing the use of portions of a copyrighted work where the use
of the work is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. See generally Note, supra note
6, at 119-20. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at
223 (D.N.J. 1977) (the nature of the copyrighted material is such that for all practical pur-
poses defendants needed to copy portions of the work); Marvin Worth Productions v. Supe-
rior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (copyrighted work deliberately
suppressed and out of circulation for many years). Cf. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) ("lack
of independent research" is merely another way of stating that verbatim copying will not be
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less, while these several qualitative factors are considered in examining the
substantiality factor, as a rule of thumb, the greater the amount of quanti-
tative work appropriated by the user, the more likely it is that the substan-
tiality factor will not indicate a fair use.78 When an entire film is
reproduced, there is likely to be not only substantial quantitative copying
but also substantial qualitative appropriation.79
Home-use recording of copyrighted films off-the-air usually involves the
copying of the entire work,"° militating against a finding of fair use.. In-
deed, the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks granted a
preliminary injunction against institutions that copied programs off-the-air
for school classroom use, emphasizing that videotaping of an entire broad-
cast film was a substantial copying."' The videotape recording of telecast
countenanced). Congress has indicated that one circumstance in which the need for the
underlying material is especially strong is where a published work is unavailable to the
potential user through normal channels because the work is out of print. See S. REP. 94-473,
94th Cong. 2d Sess., 64 (1976); Student Note, The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W.
VA. L. REV. 231, 240 (1979).
78. See Note, supra note 29, at 607; Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.DN.Y. 1970); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y.), a]Jdpercuriam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. One qualitative factor, whether the copy contains the essence of the original work,
see note 75 and accompanying text supra, is satisfied when the copy is identical to the-
original work, as is the case in copying an entire film. Another qualitative factor, the simi-
larity in style between the two works, see note 76 and accompanying text supra, is satisfied
when the reproduction of a film is a verbatim copy, see note 76 supra. The final qualitative
factor, the "need" to use the copyrighted work to produce the copier's work, is satisfied if the
copyrighted work is unavailable to the user. See note 77 and accompanying text supra. The
work which is broadcast over the airwaves may be unavailable to the average viewer under
ordinary circumstances since networks generally maintain sole possession of the videotapes
of the broadcast work; thus arguably a special need may exist to allow the making of copies
on VTRs. See Student Note, supra, note 77, at 241. However, as the number and diversity
of programming available on prerecorded cassettes increases, see note 56 supra, the need for
taping of broadcast shows will diminish.
In any case, the "unavailability" exception, sanctioned by Congress, was intended only to
apply to published works which have gone out of print. See note 77 supra. If a work is
unavailable because it is unpublished, this represents a deliberate choice of the copyright
owner and will be respected by keeping the prohibition against copying in force. See H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-65, reprinted in [19761 U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5674-78. Since under the definition of "publication" in the Act the broadcast of a
work is not a publication, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), the copying of a broadcast work would
not be permitted under the unavailability exception. See Student Note, supra, note 77, at
241.
80. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
81. Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251
(W.D.N.Y. 1978). The court feared a possible conflict between its holding and that in Wil-
liams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a]J'dmem, 420 U.S. 376
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copyrighted programs by owners of VTRs thus appears to be a substantial
taking within the meaning of the fair use doctrine and, at least in this re-
spect, appears to fall outside the scope of the fair use doctrine.82
B. For The Greater Good-The Public Interest Prong
L The Nature Factor
Traditionally, courts have found copyrighted works in the fields of sci-
ence, law, medicine, history, and biography to be within the fair use doc-
trine. 83 Courts treat the copying of works in these fields with leniency
because these works "serve the public interest in the full dissemination of
information ' 84 in two ways. First, these works consist essentially of fac-
(1975). In Williams & Wilkins, the court was dealing with the copying of articles from copy-
righted medical journals by medical libraries for the purpose of disseminating the articles to
researchers upon request. The court held the copying to be a noninfringing fair use. 487
F.2d at 1348, 1362. The Encyclopedia Britannica court held that the recording of copy-
righted broadcast films by organizations planning to disseminate the copies in schools for
classroom use was not a fair use, 447 F. Supp. at 251. The court emphasized the ertirety of
the copying and the fact that harm must be assumed to have occurred to support the motion
for preliminary relief requested in the case.
In attempting to distinguish Williams & Wilkins, the Encyclopedia Britannica court first
noted that the libraries which were alleged to be the infringers in Williams & Wilkins copied
single articles out of medical journals and not the entire copyrighted journal. The Encyclo-
pedia Britannica court further suggested that a significant difference between the two cases
was the impact on the potential markets for the respective copyrighted object. Where the
entire film is copied, as in Encyclopedia Britannica, it is interchangeable with the original
copyrighted article, thus leading to great harm to the market for the film, whereas the mar-
ket for the entire medical journal still exists if, as in Williams & Wilkins, only single articles
are copied and distributed. Encyclopedia Britannica, 447 F. Supp. at 251.
This attempt to distinguish Williams & Wilkins was unnecessary because the court in Wil-
liams & Wilkins merely said that the quantitative extent of copying, although an important
factor, is not conclusive, but must be considered along with the other fair use factors. 487
F.2d at 1353.
82. The court, in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, never expressly
stated that the substantiality factor was indicative of fair use, but attempted to mitigate its
impact by invoking the lack of harm caused by the videotaping of programs for home view-
ing. 480 F. Supp. at 454. However correct the court's final conclusion may be, the fact
remains that home video recording of copyrighted broadcasts is substantial and thus indica-
tive of an infringing use.
83. See Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973), alrd mem., 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (science and
medicine); Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (historical works and
biographies); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978) (historical and biographies); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (biographies).
84. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966).
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tual information85 affecting areas of universal concern.86 Second, since
uninhibited access to works in these fields is often essential to ensure the
continuing progress and vitality of research,87 allowing public access will
encourage the progress and advancement of science, industry, and other
scholarly endeavors. 88 Courts have usually determined that the public in-
terest in the uninhibited use of factual scholarly works outweighs the bene-
fits gained through granting exclusivity to authors of such works. 89
Film works primarily for entertainment are generally not of the schol-
arly, factual nature which courts usually allow to be copied. In Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., for example, the court found no discernible public
interest in the dissemination of a fictional motion picture work that would
endow a copier with the fair use privilege.9" Similarly, the court in Loew's
Inc. v. CBS, Inc. held that the fair use allowance of the copying of works
in the field of science or art should not be extended "to include a T.V.
program allegedly taken from a motion picture." 91 Congress has also indi-
cated that the fair use doctrine should rarely apply to films or other works
85. The importance of this factual nature of the work is shown in New York Times Co.
v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc. where the court stated that in copying a work, "rather in the
nature of a collection of facts than in the nature of creative or imaginative work ..., de-
fendants have greater license to use portions [thereof] under the fair use doctrine then they
would have if a creative work had been involved." 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977).
86. See Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). Rosenfield, supra note 45 at 791 (stating that the
"constitutional dimension [of fair use] protects the right of reasonable access to our cultural,
educational, scientific, historical, technical, and intellectual heritage").
In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., the court found an index to a
newspaper, including data grouped by "personal name," to be a "factual work," see note 85
and accompanyingtext, supra, and thus indicative of a fair use. 434 F. Supp. 217, 221
(D.N.J. 1977). Such a work, however, is not intrinsically of "universal concern" in the same
sense as historical, scientific, and medical works. Thus, perhaps the Roxbury Data court
erred in holding that a factual index is of a nature suggesting fair use.
87. Note, supra note 29, at 608. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1245, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 12973), af'dmer. , 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (stating that "medical researchers
who have asked for photocopies [of articles in copyrighted medical journals] are. . . ordina-
rily . . . scientific researchers and practitioners who need the articles for personal use in
their scientific work." See also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d
303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) ("it is both reasonable and customary for biographers to refer to and
utilize earlier [biographical] works dealing with the subject of [their] work and occasionally
to quote directly from such works").
88. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)
(use of the copyrighted work "is permitted because of the public benefit in encouraging the
development of historical and biographical works and their public distribution. . . so that
the world may not be deprived of improvements, or the progress of the arts be retarded").
89. Id
90. 329 F. Supp. 723, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
91. 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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of entertainment.92 While television broadcasts may include some factual,
scholarly programming which may fall within the traditional nature cate-
gory, programs which the public records are generally entertainment
works rather than factual, scholarly works.93 Thus, the nature of video
recorded television programs does not indicate that their VTR recording is
a fair use.
2 The Purpose Factor
The use of copyrighted material for the purposes of research,94 educa-
tion,95 and criticism 96 has been held indicative of a fair use. 97 Each of
these uses is designed to confer a benefit upon the public at large by dis-
seminating information of universal concern.98 In contrast, recording
92. See Note, supra note 19, at 609 (discussing S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-
51(1975)).
93. See Public T V study says VCRs don't detract from viewing levels, BROADCASTING,
July 21, 1980, at 46 (discussing a recent survey which shows that "over 90% of the material
videorecorded by [VTRJ owners was regular T.V. series, movies and specials"). See also
Student Note, supra note 77, at 239. But cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 480 F. Supp. at 452-53 (declining to categorize television programming as "en-
tertainment" or "educational," because "[t]he line between the transmission of ideas and
mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be
drawn at all").
94. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
afd meri, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), where the Court described the purpose for which photo-
copies of copyrighted articles in medical journals were made: "Scientific progress... is the
hallmark of the whole enterprise of duplication .. .[therefore] the law gives copying for
scientific purposes a wide scope." See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978), stating, "[flor a determination whether the fair use
defense is applicable . . . it is relevant whether or not the [copyrighted material] was used
primarily for scholarly, historical reasons."
95. Most relevant to our situation is Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), in which the defendant organization videotaped
television broadcasts of plaintiffs' copyrighted educational films off-the-air without plain-
tiffs' permission. Defendants distributed the tapes to schools for use in classrooms as teach-
ing aids. In discussing the purpose factor of the fair use doctrine, the court characterized the
use as being provided "on a strictly'noncommercial basis to a limited class of requesters for
the purpose of promoting two traditionally favored areas of endeavor: science and educa-
tion." Id at 251.
96. In addition to more traditional forms of criticism, courts are lenient in allowing use
of copyrighted materials in parodies and burlesque. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp.
443, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
97. See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp.
429, 453 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) specifically expresses the following pur-
poses to be fair uses: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . scholarship, or
research."
98. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966). The "information of universal concern" generally contemplated by courts is that
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copyrighted films off-the-air for private use merely benefits the individual.
Thus, such copying lacks the traditional fair use purpose of benefiting the
general public by dissemination of the copied works.
Another aspect of purely private use of tape recorded films, however,
may indicate a fair use-the noncommercial character. 99 Courts have ex-
plicitly stated that a use of a copyrighted work which is predominantly for
commercial exploitation is almost never a fair use.l"° Some commentators
have argued that the inverse is true, that persons who make personal, non-
commercial use of copyrighted works rarely infringe the copyright.10' The
Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,10 2 for exam-
ple, arguably indicated that the photocopying of copyrighted articles in
medical journals for private purposes is a fair use.'0 3 Similarly, in Encyclo-
pedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks,"° the court, in the course of
its fair use analysis concerning the videotaping of copyrighted programs by
educational institutions, noted that the taping was made "on a strictly non-
commercial basis."' 5 Both Williams & Wilkins and Encyclopedia Britan-
nica, however, involved uses that embodied traditional public benefit
purposes 10 6 as well as noncommercial aspects, and thus provide weak sup-
port for the proposition that a noncommercial use, which is also purely
private, is a fair use. Videotaping by private individuals for noncommer-
cial, personal use, since it is performed without an intent to benefit the
general public by contributing to the dissemination of information of uni-
versal concern, provides the public no countervailing interest superior to
same factual, scholarly information which renders the nature of the used work indicative of
fair use. The nature and purpose factors thus tend to shade into each other, but the nature
factor pertains to the purpose for which the copyright owner originally published the work,
while the purpose factor deals with the purpose for which the work is being used by the
alleged infringer. See Student Note, supra note 77, at 240.
99. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 453-54.
100. Note, supra note 29, at 610. See Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) (stating that
the fair use doctrine essentially "distinguishes between a true scholar and a chiseler who
infringes a work for personal profit"). Even if the nature of the work is such that normally its
use would be a fair one, e.g., an historical work, if the material from the work is to be used
for commercial exploitation, the use of the material is not fair. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977).
101. See Note, supra note 29, at 610-11.
102. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afdmem., 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
103. Id at 1355. ("[t]he reader who himself makes a copy does so for his own personal
work needs, and individual work needs are likewise dominant in the reproduction program
of the two medical libraries").
104. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. Id at 251.
106. Specifically, scientific and medical research in Williams & Wilkins, see note 94
supra, and educational purposes in Encyclopedia Britannica, note 95 supra.
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that of the copyright owner in exclusivity; the use is not a fair one. 107
III. Is THE MEDIUM THE MESSAGE?-THE PUBLIC INTEREST PRONG
IN LIGHT OF THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE
TAPING OF PUBLIC BROADCASTS
Under traditional fair use analysis, only the harm factor supports the
finding that VTR recording of televised films for purely private viewing is
a fair use.108 Nonetheless, the court in Sony could have reached the deci-
sion that VTR home-use recording is a fair use without further analysis. 19
Instead, noting that the traditional fair use analysis indicates the nature of
copyrighted films and the private purpose of copying them are not sup-
portive of a finding of fair use,"'i the court based its holding on two novel
features peculiar to the taping of broadcast television shows. The court
first found that the nature of the copyrighted films as voluntarily telecast
over public airwaves to individual homes free of charge indicated a fair
use."' The court then held that the use of the taped films in private homes
107. Some courts have held that, since the essential inquiry in a fair use determination is
whether a use leads to a public benefit by contributing to the flow of information of univer-
sal concern, see notes 85-89 and 94-98 and accompanying text supra, the fact that a use is
made for commercial or non-commercial purposes is irrelevant. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). But cf Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (a predominantly commer-
cial motive is relevant, although not determinative of fair use). As long as a public benefit is
conferred, it is immaterial to the underlying copyright purposes that the user reaps economic
profits or that expectation of profit is part of his motivation. See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307.
Likewise, as in our case, if the use does not lead to a further benefit for the public, the fact
that no commercial profits are intended should not make an otherwise infringing use a fair
use. See Note, Copyright.- The Betamax Case, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 203, 229 (1978).
108. See text accompanying notes 156-62 infra.
109. The harm factor is often considered the most important and central factor in reach-
ing decisions under the fair use doctrine. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[A][4]
(1980). See also Comment, Copyright Implications Attendant Upon the Uses of Home Video-
tape Recorders, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 279, 286 (1979); Student Note, supra note 77, at 243
(stating that "the importance of the harm factor has been used to explain decisions which
would otherwise be quite puzzling"). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "al-
though the Sony court purported to apply all of the fair use factors, the central and moving
factor was the absence . . . of harm." 3 M. NIMMER at § 13.05[F][5].
110. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 452-53.
111. Id at 450. The phrase, "voluntarily telecasted over public airwaves free of charge,"
is pregnant with issues. The fact that the telecast is made "free of charge" is merely sympto-
matic of the complexities of television economics. To the extent that this reflects the absence
of harm, it is a telling point, but it is more relevant in a discussion of the harm factor rather
than the nature factor. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[F][5]. For a discussion of
the inappropriateness of discussing the "free of charge" aspect with the nature factor, see
notes 115-16 and accompaning text nfra. The fact that programs are "telecast" raises first
amendment problems dealing with the "right to access" which are more relevant to the
purpose of the use, see 480F. Supp. at 454 and are discussed at notes 140-54 and accompany-
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for purely private purposes suggested a fair use. 1 2 These two issues-the
voluntary nature of broadcasts and the purely private purpose of copy-
ing-are the factors which distinguish the home-use video taping contro-
versy from other fair use controversies;1 3 the resolution of these issues was
what made the Sony opinion "the most significant of the off-the-air taping
cases." 114
A. The Voluntariness of Broadcasts
The Sony court supported its finding that voluntary broadcasts over
public airwaves are indicative of fair use by reiterating its reasoning about
the lack of harm." 5 Lack of harm arguments, no matter how persuasive,
only create confusion when used to discuss the nature of a copyrighted
work. The nature factor of the fair use analysis should be assessed inde-
pendently from the harm factor and weighted with the harm factor only
after independent assessment. 16
The only plausible argument for the Sony court's holding that voluntary
broadcasts over public airwaves are, standing alone, of a nature indicative
of fair use, is one raised by some commentators in anticipation of the
Supreme Court decision in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken." 7
These commentators reasoned that the voluntary licensing of stations by
copyright owners to broadcast the copyrighted works was equivalent to the
dedication of their works to the public, implying a public privilege to use
the broadcast signals without inhibition."' The holding in Aiken, how-
ever,that the playing of radio broadcasts in a restaurant by the restaurant
owner did not infringe the copyright in the broadcast songs," 9 failed to
support the proposition that broadcasting signals are dedicated to the pub-
ing text infra. To be discussed in the following section, see notes 115-26 and accompanying
text infra, is the fact that the broadcast is made "voluntarily over public airwaves."
112. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 450.
The court suggested two problems arising from the private home-use purpose of the copying.
The novel suggestion is that the use makes enforcement of a prohibition "highly intrusive,"
an argument apparently based on the first amendment. See id at 454. For a discussion of
this "right to privacy" argument, see notes 131-39 and accompanying text infra. The court
also mentioned the impracticality of enforcing a prohibition on in-home use, see id, an issue
also faced by Congress and discussed in that context at note 179 infra.
113. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 450.
114. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4 at § 13.05[F][5].
115. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 453.
116. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[A],[F][5].
117. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). See Note, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken: Are Broad-
casting Signals Dedicated to the Public?, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 994 (1975) (discussing the Aiken
case before the Supreme Court decision was rendered).
118. Note, supra note 117, at 1003.
119. 422 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1975).
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lic. The Supreme Court based its decision solely on the "functional test" it
had developed in cases concerning cable television. 2 ° The functional test
involves ascertaining whether the activities of the user of broadcast signals
are more akin to those of a viewer who does not perform or a broadcaster,
who does perform, and determining whether the user infringes the copy-
right owners' right to perform accordingly. 12 1 In Aiken, the Court deter-
mined that one who merely activates a radio in a restaurant is functionally
more akin to a viewer/nonperformer than a broadcaster/performer.
22
The Court never suggested that the basis for its decision was an implied
consent by the copyright owner to the unrestricted public use of their copy-
righted works. Even ifAiken implies that copyright owners dedicate their
work to the public by licensing them to be broadcast over public airwaves,
the holding was limited to the effect of broadcast on a copyright owner's
exclusive right to perform his work. Thus, at most, the Aiken case only
supports the conclusion that copyright owners who allow the public broad-
cast of their works surrender only the exclusive right to perform, retaining
the remainder of their exclusive rights, including the right to make cop-
ies. 123
An examination of the Act supports the proposition that the voluntary
nature of broadcasting films over public airwaves does not create an im-
plied license for public copying. The Act contains a limited number of
explicit exemptions from copyright sanctions for off-the-air taping of
broadcasted programs. For example, the Act expressly exempts from
copyright sanctions videotaping of news programs by libraries for non-
commercial distribution to scholars and researchers.124 The Act further
states that the off-the-air taping of audiovisual works not falling within the
express exemptions can only be noninfringing if they fall within the fair
use privilege.125 Thus, not all broadcasts over public airwaves are consid-
ered, by their nature, exempt from copyright limitations on use. The fact
that the copyrighted programs are voluntarily broadcast does not indicate,
by itself, that the copying of the program is a fair use.'
26
120. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc. 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976).
122. 422 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1975).
123. See Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DUKE L.J.
1181, 1196 (1977).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 108(0(3) (1976).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h), (f)(4) (1976). See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[F][5].
126. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1198. The case of Walt Disney Productions v.
Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969), also supports the
conclusion that the nature of the copyrighted works at issue as voluntarily telecast over
public airwaves is not indicative of fair use. The case involved the videotaping off-the-air of
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B. First Amendment Issues
The paramount inquiry in copyright infringement cases is whether the
first amendment creates a public interest in allowing dissemination of the
copyrighted work.' 27 The fair use doctrine has been contoured by courts
to balance the public interest in uninhibited access to knowledge against
the copyright owner's interest in restricting that access.' 28 Courts have
thus used the doctrine to resolve conflicts between the copyright laws' right
to exclusivity and first amendment interests in access. 129 Where the first
amendment interest in unrestricted access outweighs the copyright owner's
right to limited exclusivity, the first amendment will have primacy. 130
The Sony court indirectly utilized this constitutional argument, reason-
ing that the private video recording of copyrighted programs by individu-
als in their private homes should be a fair use because a prohibition
against such activity would be highly intrusive. 3  This argument is
rooted in the first amendment right of privacy. The Supreme Court dis-
cussed this right in support of its holding in Stanley v. Georgia that a stat-
ute prohibiting mere possession of filmed or printed obscene matter in the
privacy of the home violated the first amendment. 32 The Supreme Court
stated that the first amendment protection of the right to receive informa-
tion and ideas includes "the right to be free, except in very limited circum-
stances, from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's privacy." 33
The Stanley court considered it beyond the power of the state to "reach
into the privacy of one's own home. . . . [and tell] a man. . . what books
plaintiffs' broadcast programs for the purpose of broadcasting the taped programs over an
Alaskan cable television network. Id at 1074. The court held that the preparation of the
videotapes infringed the copyright owners rights. Id at 1075. The precise holding of the
case has been overruled by legislative fiat. 17 U.S.C. § II l(e)(2), (f) (1976). The Disney case
neither discussed the video recording issue within a fair use framework, Encyclopedia
Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 248 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), nor
dealt with copying for a commercial purpose. It held, however, that off-the-air taping of
voluntarily broadcast films constituted an infringement, which suggests that the fact of vol-
untary broadcasting does not itself limit the scope of copyright protection. See Comment,
supra note 123, at 1198.
127. See Note, supra note 6, at 119.
128. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
129. See Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d
Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1977); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens For
Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
130. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aft'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
131. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
132. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
133. 1d at 564.
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* . .he may read or what films he may watch." '134
Thus, prohibiting possession of such films prevents an individual from
viewing what he pleases in the privacy of his home, the Court's primary
first amendment concern. The home VTR recording situation is clearly
distinguishable in that prohibiting the copying of televised programs (and
thus arguably the private possession of the resulting tapes) does not pre-
vent an individual from viewing the programs that are broadcast in the
privacy of the home. No regulation of private thought ensues, since the
homeowner may watch what he pleases. The mere prohibition against
making copies of a broadcast program thus does not violate an individual's
right to privacy in the Stanleysense.
135
The Court also distinguished between statutory schemes that further the
public interest by prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials, from
statutory schemes, such as in Stanley, that prohibit on their face the mere
possession of obscene materials, albeit in furtherance of an otherwise valid
anti-dissemination purpose. 136 The Court held that the latter could not be
justified even as a "necessary incident . . . to ease the administration of
otherwise valid criminal laws."' 37 Statutes designed to control the distri-
bution of materials against the public interest, however, have been up-
held.' 38 The Act's prohibition against reproducing copyrighted material, a
statutory scheme deemed to be in the public interest, does not on its face
prohibit the mere possession of copies of original works. Possession in the
home of videotapes produced by recordings of television programs may be
protected by the first amendment right to privacy; the making of those
tapes, however, even in the home, is legitimately prohibited by the Act.
139
134. Id at 565.
135. Indeed, the copyright prohibition, by encouraging the creation and disclosure of
artistic works, in its broadest sense, furthers the first amendment right to receive information
and ideas. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978). See also Note, supra note 6, at 119.
136. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68.(1968).
137. Id
138. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); United States v. Gower, 316 F.
Supp. 1390, 1394 n.10 (D.D.C. 1970).
139. The statute involved in Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), broadly made
"[elvery person who knowingly. . . prepares. . . any obscene matter. . . guilty of a misde-
meanor" without qualification as to an intent to distribute. Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 116 n.2. In
Kafplan, however, the creation of obscene material in the house was not at issue.
It may be argued that since the copying of copyrighted programs itself occurs in the home
and since there is no intent to further distribute the tapes, Stanley v. Georgia's right to pri-
vacy extends to protect such copying. Since the Stanley decision was rendered, however,
numerous Supreme Court cases indicate an extreme reluctance to extend the holding beyond
the precise factual setting in Stanley See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super
8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973); Paris Adult Theater, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (viewing in
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Although the right to privacy recognized in Stanley does not support a
finding that the video recording of copyrighted programs for private view-
ing is a fair use, the Sony court determined that the video recording of
broadcast programs is consistent with the first amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through public air-
waves.'4 ° The Sony court based this finding upon Supreme Court cases
which have balanced the competing interests of broadcasters and the view-
ing public. 4 ' The Supreme Court has stated that the first amendment pro-
tects "the public['s] . . .[right] to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas" over the television medium.142 This right
is part of the public's "right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment [since] . . .[it] is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas." ' 43 The Court, however, has also recognized the need imposed by
the inherent scarcity of broadcast frequencies to apportion these frequen-
cies among a finite number of licensees.'" Since not all persons who seek
to communicate via broadcast media can be accommodated, access to the
ideas which can be broadcast is necessarily limited.' 45 Nonetheless, the
public interest in preserving the television medium as an "uninhibited
marketplace of ideas" was held to be the paramount consideration over the
right of individual licensees to broadcast what they choose in matters of
public importance.' 46 The fairness doctrine, which requires broadcasters
to provide an adequate and balanced coverage of issues of public impor-
tance,147 requires broadcast licensees to implement the public interest in
public theater not protected); 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (selling of obscene book in store not pro-
tected); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (transporting in interstate commerce by
private carriage not protected). In dicta, the Stanley court recognized the need for allowing
governmental intrusion into the home in "limited circumstances." 394 U.S. at 564. Post-
Stanley cases indicate that a state may regulate the private activities of an individual as long
as it does not expressly limit the right to possess information-bearing materials in the pri-
vacy of the home. Cf. Oto, 413 U.S. at 141 (the right to possession of obscene material does
not create a correlative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it).
140. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454. For
discussion of the way the Supreme Court has delineated the first amendment right to access
as applied to the broadcast medium, see notes 142-48 and accompanying text infra.
141. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
142. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
143. Id
144. See id at 388-89; CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
145. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1200-01.
146. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968).
147. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111-12 (1973).
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the widest range of vital information. 4 s
The public's right to receive suitable access to broadcast ideas is thus not
a general right of access to the maximum possible amount of program-
ming, as suggested in the Sony opinion.'4 9 Rather, it is a right to be ex-
posed to "opposing views" in order to counterbalance the limitations in the
expression of ideas inherent in the allocation of a small number of broad-
cast frequencies to a large number of people with diverse ideas.' 50 As the
Supreme Court has stated, the right is "the right of the public to be in-
formed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any broad-
cast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
particular views on any matter."'' (emphasis supplied).
Indeed, the purpose of the public's first amendment right to access to
broadcast materials, to ensure that the public receives the fullest range of
ideas over the broadcast medium, is enhanced if the Act prohibits copying
of broadcast programs. The copyright protection ensures that artistic
works are created and disclosed, which in turn leads to a greater variety of
works available to be broadcast, which finally leads to full range of ideas
being received by the public. 52 Further, the copyright scheme restrains
only the copying of broadcast materials; it clearly does not inhibit the use
of concepts or ideas underlying the broadcast programs.' 53 Therefore, like
the right to privacy, the first amendment right to suitable access to ideas
broadcast over the television medium does not provide an overriding pub-
lic interest that outweighs the copyright owners' interest in restricting the
copying of broadcast programs.1 54
IV. WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR (LEGISLATIVE) FRIENDS-
WEIGHING THE FAIR USE FACTORS
After an examination of the impact of VTR recording of broadcasts for
home use on each of the fair use factors, the fair use doctrine requires a
148. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1199.
149. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
150. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1199.
151. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112-13 (1973) (quoting Report
on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)).
152. See Note, supra note 6, at 248. Cf. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (both the Copyright Act and first
amendment aim to ensure that society will continue to receive vital contributions and
thereby preserve an atmosphere conducive to the interchange of ideas).
153. See notes 131-35 and accompanying text supra. The mere fact that the copyrighted
material is broadcast over the airwaves should not narrow the scope of copyright protection.
Comment, supra note 123, at 1202 (interpreting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
154. See notes 127-30 and accompanying text supra.
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balancing of its four factors to determine whether the VTR recording is a
noninfringing use. The weighing involves first assessing the "harm" and
"substantiality" factors to ascertain whether the recording will reduce the
incentive of film-makers to create films, and then assessing the "nature"
and "purpose" factors to determine if a greater public interest in un-
restricted access exists to outweigh the copyright owners' interest in exclu-
sivity. 155
As to the reduction in incentive to create films, the substantiality analysis
shows that VTR users usually copy the entire work, a fact often indicative
of substantial harm to the market for the work. 156 The more detailed harm
analysis, however, shows that home VTR use in actuality does not tend to
harm the market for the broadcast films. 157 Since the harm factor usually
is considered the most important factor, 158 and because it involves analyz-
ing actual effects whereas the substantiality factor merely presupposes that
an entire taking usually indicates a reduction in incentive, the conflict be-
tween the results of analyzing the two factors should be resolved in favor
of the harm factor's result. Thus, on balance, the off-the-air videotaping of
copyrighted films by individuals for home-use should not significantly re-
duce the incentive of film-makers to create films.
Regarding the greater public interest, the traditional fair use analysis
indicates that videotaped programs are not of the scholarly, factual nature
that courts traditionally have found indicative of a public interest in un-
restricted access. Rather, the taped programs are of the entertainment va-
riety which are rarely indicative of a fair use.'5 9 Further, the voluntary
broadcasting of films over public airwaves does not create an implied li-
cense to copy the films and thus alter the conclusion that the nature factor
does not indicate fair use. 160  An analysis of the purposes of the
copyrighted films' use suggest that copying is not a fair use. The noncom-
mercial use is not protected, absent an intent by the appropriator to dis-
seminate his work,'6 1 and the first amendment rights to privacy and access
to ideas are not violated by enforcing a prohibition against copying televi-
sion shows. 162 Thus, neither the nature factor nor the purpose factor ap-
pear indicative of a fair use.
One additional fact raised in the Sony opinion, involving legislative in-
155. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 52-71 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 117-26 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 94-107 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 127-54 and accompanying text supra.
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tent to permit home-use recording of copyrighted programs, 16 3 must be
considered before reaching a conclusion as to the weight of the public's
interest in the unrestricted videotaping of broadcast films for home-use.
The House Report accompanying a 1971 statute establishing copyright
protection for owners of sound recordings 1 64 stated: "[lit is not the inten-
tion of the Committee to restrain the home recording. . . of recorded per-
formances, where the home recording is for private use and with no
purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.'
' 65
The intent of Congress not to restrain home-sound for private, noncom-
mercial use in the 1971 statute seems clear.' 66 Two arguments exist, how-
ever, opposing the proposition that Congress intended to except the video
recording of films for home-use from copyright protection. First, the ex-
press language and legislative history of the Act, a total revision of the
Copyright Act of 1909 in response to the massive technological changes
which had occurred since 1909, provide no support for a continuation of
the home-sound recording exception created in the 1971 amendment.'
67
Second, even if the sound recording exception is continued in the Act, its
extension to the recording of television programs is inappropriate.'
68
Support for the first argument rests on the absence of any reference to
home use exceptions of any kind in either the statutory language or legisla-
tive history of the Act. 16 9 Further, while the Act expressly limits certain
163. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 443-46.
164. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
165. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
166. Professor Nimmer suggests that the absence of an explicit exception in the language
of the 1971 statute, see Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), indicates that no home-use
exception was intended. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.05[C] n.20. However, courts
have held that legislative intent as expressed in the statutory history can prevail over the
absence of statutory language on a particular issue. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1207
n.139. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 700 n.28 (1979) (discussing
floor debates which indicated a private right of action exists to enforce Title VI in the con-
text of elementary and secondary education despite its absence in the statutory language).
167. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1216.
168. See id at 1217.
169. See Student Note, supra note 77, at 247; 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.05 [C].
Professor Nimmer suggests that affirmative support for the position that the 1971 home-use
exception is not continued in the Act rests in the Act's legislative history, which states that
the fair use doctrine "is not intended to give [taping] any special status under the fair use
provision or to sanction any reproduction beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair
use." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1976). This statement, however, is
merely meant to explain the limits of § 107's explicit inclusion of "reproduction. . .in pho-
norecords" within the ambit of fair use analysis. It does not purport to limit congressional
exemptions arising from other than the explicit language of § 107.
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exclusive rights,17° the Act does not expressly limit a copyright owner's
exclusive right to copy phonorecords. 7 ' The 1971 statute, however, was
incorporated nearly verbatim into the Act. 172 The close identity of the lan-
guage in the two acts suggests that the legislative history of the 1971 statute
pertains equally to the Act. 17 3 Thus, any exception to copyright protection
granted to home tapers of sound recordings in the 1971 statute would seem
to be incorporated unchanged into the Act.'
74
Strong support exists for the second proposition that the extension of
such an exception to recording of television programs is inappropriate.
The strongest authority lies in the language of the Act expressly including
television programs in the statutory definition of "audiovisual works."
170. The exclusive right to publiclyperform a work, for example, is limited to "literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works." 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976). The right to publicly display a work is simi-
larly limited to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1976).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976). The argument is that if Congress had intended to allow
home use copying, it would have expressly qualified the right to copy as it had other rights.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 443. The basis of
this argument is the canon of statutory construction that the express presence of limitations
in one statutory section usually negatively implies the absence of limitations in other similar
provisions containing no limitations. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S.I 1, 19, 20 (1979). However, this interpretation can yield to persuasive evidence of a
contrary legislative intent. Id
The legislative history is silent as to why limitations are placed on some exclusive rights
but not others. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-65 (1976). The limitations
refer, however, only to the nature or type of the copyrighted work, see note 170 supra; the
limitations shed no light at all on congressional intent regarding the purpose for which a
work is being appropriated. For a discussion of affirmative evidence of a legislative intent
concerning the continuation of the home-sound recording exception, see notes 173-76 and
accompanying text infra.
172. Compare Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 114(b), 402
(1976).
173. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1217. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 667 (1979), the Court reasoned that where a statute was enacted after an earlier statute
and patterned after the earlier statute (except for a substitution of words defining the group
to be affected by the statute, the two statutes used identical language), Congress would have
been aware of the way the prior statute was interpreted and would have intended the later
statute to be interpreted the same way. 441 U.S. at 694-703. In that case, the Court held that
the private right of action implied in Title VI was also to be implied in Title IX, even though
both statutes were not only silent on their faces regarding the implication, but also had
legislative histories silent on the matter. In our situation, the later statute is not only pat-
terned on the prior statute but in fact incorporates bodily the language of the earlier statute.
Further, the prior statute in this case has a legislative history which is not silent but expressly
provides the implied right in the statute. The Cannon holding thus applies with at least
equal vigor to the situation of attempting to find a continuation in the Act of the implied
right to record sound recordings in the home.
174. But see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[F][5] n.159.
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Audiovisual works are separate definitional entities from "sound record-
ings" or "phonorecords" in the Act.' 75 The implication is that making
video tapes of broadcast programs differs from making audio tapes of
sound recordings under the statute, and therefore that the former is not
subject to the copyright exception reserved for the latter. The two separate
definitions, however, probably reflect nothing more than the fact that in
the Act Congress addressed the problems of the new technology that had
arisen since passage of the Copyright Act of 1909.176 Separate sections of
the Act deal with separate problems as they had arisen, and thus separate
definitions were needed. The definitional section was not intended to im-
ply substantive differences between audiovisual works and sound record-
ings. 17 7
The acts of making recordings of sounds and making recordings of
images seem indistinguishable for infringement purposes. 178 Testimony at
legislative hearings and floor debates pertaining to the 1971 statute recog-
nize the similarity between copying sounds and copying television pro-
grams by indicating specifically that VTR recording was subject to the
same private, noncommercial use exception as sound recording. 79 Since
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also Comment, supra note 123, at 1217. One com-
mentator has argued that the express limited exemption in the Act for copying daily news-
casts of television networks by libraries or archives, see 17 U.S.C. § 108(0(3) (1976), by
negative implication precludes an exception for general video taping. See Student Note,
supra note 77, at 247. While the Act was being considered, however, home VTRs were not
widely available; only public institutions had access to the VTR technology. See id at 246
n.100 (Sony first offered home VTR for sale in the U.S. in late 1975). Thus, the absence of
an express provision in the Act dealing with home VTR recording merely indicates that such
recording was not an issue before Congress at the time of passage of the Act, not that Con-
gress consciously chose not to address it.
176. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976).
177. The House Report accompanying the Act states that the only reasons for providing
separate definitions for various categories of works were to clarify the unsettled meanings of
the terms and to distinguish between a copyrightable work and the material object embody-
ing the work. Id at 54.
The Act itself accords identical treatment in at least one instance to phonorecords and
certain audiovisual works, see 17 U.S.C. § 108(b), (c), (h) (1976), undercutting the proposi-
tion that such works are intended to be treated separately for all purposes.
178. See Comment, supra note 123, at 1218.
179. Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Registrar of Copyrights, indicated in a commit-
tee hearing on the 1971 statute that recording of television programs on VTRs was a problem
that Congress would face in the future, but that the problem was primarily with private
copying for later public distribution, not copying for private viewing. She stated that en-
forcement of copyrights on broadcast programs could not reasonably be extended into the
home, and that the problem was something that could not practically be controlled. See
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings." Hearings on S646 Before the Subcomm.L No. 3 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1971). Further, Representative Kas-
tenmeier, chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee responsible for the Act, implied in
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at the time of passage of both the 1971 statute and the Act, VTR technol-
ogy was not at a stage where its use in the home required an explicit con-
gressional response,' 80 these sources are especially relevant in determining
congressional intent. 8 ' Thus it appears that Congress intended the private
use exception to apply broadly to noncommercial, private recording of tel-
evision programs as well as sound recordings.
In effect Congress has indicated that a strong public interest exists in
allowing private videotaping of broadcast films, which outweighs the copy-
right owners' interest in prohibiting the private use. Since manifestations
of congressional intent are entitled to great weight in situations involving
complex technology, ' 82 the requisite public interest exists, despite indica-
tions to the contrary by the nature and purpose factor analysis. Both the
major fair use considerations-the lack of any significant reduction in the
incentive for filmmakers to create and the public interest in unrestricted
access to broadcast films for private usel 83-support a conclusion that the
VTR recording of broadcast programs for private viewing is a noninfring-
ing fair use. 184
floor debates on the 1971 statute that recording for personal pleasure of a program coming
into the home on television airwaves was not to be prohibited by the copyright provisions.
117 CONG. REC. 34,748 (1971).
180. See note 175 supra.
181. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (statements in floor debate by
provision's sponsor are entitled to weight). Cf. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969)
(courts should use the statements of administrators that are made in committee hearings and
that concern departmental construction of enabling legislation to resolve ambiguity in favor
of administrative interpretation absent contrary indication of legislative intent).
182. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff'd mem. 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (citing "the need for Congressional treatment of the
problems of photocopying"); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
390, 401 (1968) (in deciding whether cable television operators infringed the copyright's ex-
clusive right to perform, the ultimate accommodation between the many competing interests
is a "job . . . for Congress"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1978) (in deciding
whether a mathematical formula for computer programs should be patentable, "difficult
questions of policy concerning [technological issues] can be answered by Congress on the
basis of current empirical data not equally available to the tribunal. . . . [w]e would require
a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who
[sought to widen the scope of the patent laws by widening the range of patentable objects]").
Although the courts in these cases were calling for specific legislation to provide an "ulti-
mate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems" in the technological fields,
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS. Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974), indication of legislative prefer-
ence short of actual legislation may still provide the basis to bring about a more principled
decision.
183. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
184. Since both prongs are present, there is no need to decide the difficult question of
whether both prongs must be present before fair use can be found. In his article Exemptions
and Fair Use in Copyright.- The "Exclusive Rights" Tension in the New Copyright Act, supra
note 4, Professor Seltzer argues a dichotomy arising from the normal expectations of the
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V. CONCLUSION
The booming and expanding home VTR industry has generated the pos-
sibility of widescale copyright infringement by private individuals who
record programs, originally telecast over public airwaves, for their own
private viewing. Under a constitutionally sound fair use analysis, such an
infringement would occur only if the homeowners' video recording re-
duced the incentive of film producers to produce films for the television
market, and the public had no special interest in copying programs for
private use which outweighed the copyright owners' interest in prohibiting
the copying. Far from reducing the incentive to create, VTR recording for
subsequent private playbacks holds the potential to increase film producers
revenues, since the playback audience represents an additional element to
television ratings together with the audience for live broadcasts. Although
a fair use examination of the peculiar features of VTR recording of pub-
licly broadcast shows for private viewing reveals no special public interest
permitting such copying, Congress has manifested an intent to allow such
private recording free from copyright restrictions, carving out a special
public interest. Since private video recording does not damage the consti-
tutional basis of the Act, it is a noninfringing fair use under the Copyright
Act of 1976.
John Bara
copyright owner and society. The copyright owner expects that the "copyright scheme itself
will sometimes require use of this work necessary in the public interest," while society ex-
pects that "the copyright scheme will allow such use without reducing the author's incen-
tive." Id at 242. Thus, Professor Seltzer continues, a noninfringing use will occur whenever
a use "is necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, literature, and the arts AND [sic] does
not deprive the creator of an appropriately expected economic reward." Id at 243. This
argument suggests that both circumstances must be present before a use can be correctly
considered noninfringing.
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